We analyze whether analysts sacrifice forecast accuracy for informativeness by examining: (1) the association between analysts" deviations from management guidance and earnings management (proxied by abnormal accruals and restatement-related misstatements) and (2) the effect of the deviations on abnormal accrual mispricing. The evidence indicates that analysts deviate from management guidance to correct for perceived earnings management. Although the deviations reduce the analysts" forecast accuracy, they improve the informativeness of the forecasts. More specifically, they bring the analyst forecasts closer to the true (unmanaged) earnings number and reduce accruals mispricing. An implicit assumption in the literature is that more accurate analyst forecasts (i.e., forecasts that are closer to the actual reported earnings) are better for investors, and that analysts" primary objective is to forecast the reported (managed) earnings number accurately. Our analysis suggests that this is not necessarily the case and that an inaccurate forecast can actually be more informative than an accurate one. Prior studies on analyst deviations from management forecasts focus on analysts" incentives to issue forecasts that managers can beat. These studies implicitly assume that analysts side with management against the interests of their clients. Our analysis indicates that analysts could also deviate from short-term management forecasts to provide useful valuation information to their clients. JEL Classification: G14, M41
Introduction
Managers are often alleged to manage their reported earnings, sometimes with the intent to mislead investors. If managers forecast and report misleading earnings numbers and analysts deviate from these forecasts to convey their best estimates of the firms" true earnings, 1 then the analyst forecasts are likely to be inaccurate. It appears then that an analyst who is primarily concerned about the accuracy of her forecasts has to succumb to the managers" efforts to mislead investors. However, analysts" primary function should be to provide useful valuation information to their clients and to help them uncover mispricing. Failing in this function can have severe valuation consequences, considering that investors often use earnings models, including some crude ones (e.g., forward price-to-earnings multiples), to value firms. It is therefore important to analyze the extent to which analyst earnings forecasts contain incrementally useful valuation information over management guidance, when the earnings numbers that managers forecast and report are potentially manipulated.
To conduct our analysis, we examine the association between analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings (the last management forecast issued after the end of the fiscal quarter) and earnings management (proxied by abnormal accruals and restatement-related misstatements). A very important assumption of our analysis is that both management forecasts and reported earnings can be misleading. More specifically, we assume that, if a manager plans to report a manipulated earnings number, she will likely issue a forecast that reflects the intended earnings manipulation. This assumption is consistent with Feng et al. (2011) , who find that guidance issued by firms that ultimately restate their earnings "is more in line with their manipulated earnings than with their restated true earnings." We conjecture that, if an analyst"s primary objective is to provide useful valuation input to her clients and she has reasons to believe that the preannounced earnings do not reflect true performance, then she will be less likely to update her forecast in the direction of the preannounced earnings. Even if the analyst is convinced that managers are manipulating earnings, it is generally impractical for her to explicitly accuse them of such activities. Deviating from (or not responding to) the preannounced earnings could be a less costly means for the analyst to signal her disagreement with the managers than to openly accusing them of earnings management.
At first glance, it might appear implausible that analysts would deliberately choose to issue forecasts that they know will differ from the reported earnings. However, our reading of hundreds of analyst reports indicates that analysts routinely do exactly that. As we explain in more detail in the next section, analysts often write their reports to leave no doubt in an informed reader"s mind that their forecasting models generate both short-term and long-term numbers that conflict with management guidance. Moreover, they often show little concern that the reported earnings would differ from their short-term forecasts, arguing that the forecasts published in their research reports are targeted towards clients with medium-to long-term horizons, as opposed to those trading on short-term earnings news (Wall Street Journal 2009) . They use other means (phone calls, email alerts, special gatherings, and special reports) to communicate with clients who trade on short-term news. Their objective is to provide their clients information that meets their investment needs. As the Wall Street Journal (2009) notes:
"Analysts have a financial incentive to give clients useful information. Goldman sets aside roughly 50% of money allotted each year to analyst compensation to distribute based on feedback from trading customers. The balance of analysts" pay is determined by the performance of their stock picks. That pay system is common among major Wall Street firms." Forecast accuracy per se is not factored into the compensation scheme. Therefore, the notion that analysts would sacrifice forecast accuracy for informativeness seems quite reasonable. We provide a detailed discussion of this issue in Section 2.
The results of our study hold whether we base our analysis on earnings preannouncements or management guidance in general. However, analyst responses to management guidance depend on the managers" forecasting ability (Williams 1996) . By using preannounced earnings, we control for crosssectional variations in managers" forecasting ability. At the time of a preannouncement (i.e., after the end of a fiscal quarter), managers generally know what earnings number they will report. It is difficult to conceive a situation where analysts would know better than managers what the reported earnings will be after the end of the quarter. Hence, although our results also hold for management forecasts issued prior to the end of the fiscal quarter, earnings preannouncements offer a better setting to test the notion that analysts deviate from management forecasts to provide more value-relevant information to their clients.
We could have examined analysts" forecast errors, instead of analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings. However, there is a clear advantage in using the deviations. A major difference between analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings and analysts" forecast errors is that the preannounced earnings are known to analysts before they issue their forecasts whereas the reported earnings are not. For the deviation, the publication of the benchmark (the preannounced earnings) precedes the analyst forecast whereas, for the forecast error, the publication of the benchmark (the actual earnings) follows the analyst forecast. In addition, many firms do not issue earnings preannouncements, which analysts could use to guide their forecasts. Therefore, earnings management may be associated with analyst forecast errors not because analysts want to forecast unmanaged earnings but because they cannot anticipate earnings management. By using earnings preannouncements, we control for constraints on analysts" forecasting ability.
It might also seem that analyst forecast revisions would be better proxies for analyst responses to the preannouncements than the deviations. However, forecast revisions may not capture the extent to which analysts believe the preannouncements reflect earnings management. For instance, both the initial and the revised forecasts could differ from a preannouncement by 1 unit for one firm and by 10 units for another firm. Although both firms would have a revision of zero, analysts" disagreement with the preannouncement is obviously much more pronounced for the second firm. The deviation better captures analysts" assessments of the extent to which the preannouncements reflect earnings management.
Note also that we do not assume that analysts forecast the reported earnings and then back out the expected earnings management. We simply assume that analysts form their own estimates of the firm"s performance using their own forecasting models, and those who want to convey to their clients useful valuation inputs deviate from the preannounced earnings if they believe that the preannounced earnings do not reflect true performance. Again, we assume that, if managers intend to manage earnings by a certain amount, in general, they will incorporate this amount into their preannounced earnings. Analysts who want to communicate to their clients their assessments of the firm"s true (unmanaged) earnings are thereby likely to deviate from the preannounced earnings by the extent of the earnings management.
Therefore, if analysts convey useful incremental valuation information to their clients through their earnings forecasts, we expect the forecasts" deviations from the preannounced earnings (analyst forecasts minus preannounced earnings) to be negatively associated with earnings management.
Consider, for instance, two firms (M and N) that have unmanaged earnings of $1.0 each. Assume that the managers of Firm M manage earnings upward by $0.2 and the managers of Firm N do not manage earnings. Then, the reported (managed) earnings will be $1.2 for Firm M and $1.0 for Firm N. If analysts forecast the true (unmanaged) earnings and the managers preannounce the reported earnings, the deviations of the analyst forecasts from the preannounced earnings will be -0.2 for Firm M and zero for Firm N and, therefore, there will be a negative correlation between the deviation and earnings management. In contrast, if analysts forecast the reported (managed) earnings, then the deviation will be zero (or some random error) for both firms and there will be no correlation between the deviation and earnings management.
We are not the first to argue that analysts could sacrifice accuracy to pursue other objectives.
There is a vast literature that suggests that analysts routinely bias their forecasts for various reasons. 2 Feng and McVay (2010) , in particular, find that, analysts wishing to curry favor with management overweight management guidance when revising their short-term earnings forecasts in response to management guidance. If some analysts sacrifice forecast accuracy to please management by overweighting management guidance, it seems then plausible that those acting in the interest of their clients could also sacrifice accuracy by underweighting guidance that they believe does not reflect true performance. Actually, the notion that analysts would issue inaccurate forecasts so that they can have access to management does not make much sense if the ultimate objective of the analysts is to forecast earnings accurately. The whole argument would be circular. The proposition makes sense only if analysts use the access to management to obtain useful information that they can communicate to their clients, which would benefit their brokerage firms. Alternatively, analysts can bias their forecasts to attract and maintain investment banking relationships, as suggested by Dugar and Nathan (1995) , Lin and McNichols (1998), and McVay (2010) .
Our conjecture that analysts could sacrifice accuracy for informativeness is consistent with Beyer and Guttman (2011), who show that, in a setting where an analyst"s payoff depends on the trading volume that her forecast generates as well as on her forecast error, the analyst is likely to bias her forecast in the direction of her private information. It is also in line with the views of many analysts, including Richard Wayman, co-founder of researchstock.com, who argues that the careers of those who routinely reiterate management forecasts "will not last long. They may be successful for a while but they will eventually become known as followers, devoid of any original thinking. A truly successful analyst will use guidance to evaluate management expertise and credibility. Management guidance will be an ingredient in her forecast, but not the only one, and it will be seasoned with a healthy dose of skepticism and additional analysis." 3 Consistent with this view, Hong (2004, p. 111) notes that there are strong indications of crosssectional variations in analysts" earnings forecasting behavior. He observes that not all analysts blindly follow optimistic forecasts issued by managers or are "able to be cheerleaders for stocks, depending on their moral concerns or aptitude [or career horizons]." 4
The empirical results are consistent with our expectations. We find a very strong negative association between abnormal accruals and analysts" deviations from pre-announced earnings (analyst forecasts minus preannounced earnings). We also find that analysts are more likely to deviate from earnings preannouncements when the reported earnings include misstatements that ultimately lead to restatements. These findings strongly support the notion that analysts deviate from preannounced earnings to correct for perceived earnings management, which is consistent with our conjecture that they sacrifice forecast accuracy for informativeness.
Comments in the financial press and extant empirical evidence suggest that managers often guide analyst forecasts to beatable levels (Fox, 1997; Wall Street Journal 1997a , 1997b Business Week 1999; Matsumoto 2002; and Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002) . If an analyst has reasons to believe that the managers are playing this game and she wants to be accurate, then she is likely to maintain her forecast above the preannounced earnings, based on the assumption that the preannounced earnings are downward biased. Extant studies generally focus on this feature of the interaction between analyst and management forecasts. However, we find no evidence that analysts increase their forecast accuracy by deviating from preannounced earnings. The consensus analyst forecast error actually increases with the absolute deviation, which indicates that, on average, the consensus forecast would be more accurate if analysts simply reiterate the preannounced earnings.
It is also alleged that analysts exert pressure on managers to report higher earnings (Fuller and Jensen 2002; Beyer 2008) , presumably to keep stock prices high and create trading volume for their 3 http://www.researchstock.com/cgi-bin/rview.cgi?c=commenta&rsrc=RC-20050306-F (accessed on 2/15/2011). 4 Hong (2004) notes that many analysts take the risk of being fired or passed over for promotion. brokerage firms. It might seem then that our findings could result from this potential "game" between managers and analysts. However, while we document a negative association between abnormal accruals and analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings, the strategic game between managers and analysts implies, if anything, a positive association between abnormal accruals and the deviations. The lower the preannounced earnings are below the analyst forecasts, the more the managers would have to inflate earnings to meet the analyst forecasts, which would result in a positive association between abnormal accruals and the deviations. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the "game" between analysts and managers could explain the negative association between abnormal accruals and the deviations that we document.
Consistent with this argument, we also find no evidence that our results are due to cases where analysts might be resisting managers" effort to walk down their forecasts to beatable levels or cases where managers might have been pressured to inflate earnings at the last minute to meet overly optimistic analyst forecasts.
To further test whether analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings improve analyst forecast informativeness, we examine the impact of the deviations on the stock price effects of the preannouncements and on the extent to which investors are misled by earnings management. The deviations are deemed to improve earnings forecast informativeness if they mitigate the market reaction to the preannouncements and reduce abnormal accruals mispricing. If analyst deviations from earnings preannouncements are effective, then they should temper the market reaction to the preannouncements. If investors are misled by accrual management and analysts deviate from preannounced earnings to communicate to their clients their assessments of the firms" true performance, the deviations should reduce the mispricing of abnormal accruals. The evidence is consistent with our expectations. Our findings are actually quite remarkable. The (abnormal) accrual anomaly is related to the relatively low persistence of (abnormal) accruals (Sloan 1996) . However, we find that analysts are more likely to deviate from preannounced earnings as the persistence of the abnormal accruals decreases and, yet, no evidence of abnormal accrual mispricing for those cases where analysts deviate from preannounced earnings. These findings strongly indicate that the deviation mitigates the abnormal accrual mispricing.
Our results have some important implications. An implicit assumption in the literature is that more accurate analyst forecasts (i.e., forecasts that are closer to the actual reported earnings) are better for investors, and that analysts" primary objective is to forecast the reported (managed) earnings number accurately. 5 Our analysis suggests that this is not necessarily the case and that an inaccurate forecast can actually be more informative than an accurate one. Prior studies on analyst deviations from management forecasts focus on analysts" incentives to issue forecasts that managers can beat. These studies implicitly assume that analysts side with management against the interests of their clients. Our study is, to our knowledge, the first to indicate that analysts could also deviate from short-term management forecasts to provide useful valuation information to their clients.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses two main issues related to our primary proposition. Section 3 describes our research design. Section 4 describes the sample selection process. The results are reported in Section 5. The study concludes in Section 6.
Related issues
We discuss two important issues associated with the assumption that some analysts could decide to not incorporate potential earnings management in their forecasts. They relate to the rationality of the assumption and its apparent conflict with analysts" incentives.
Do analysts care primarily about forecast accuracy?
As mentioned earlier, there is an implicit assumption in the literature that analysts" main objective is to accurately forecast the reported earnings number. However, analysts" primary function is actually to provide their clients with valuation input; and, because firms allegedly manage earnings, the reported earnings do not always represent analysts" best estimates of a firm"s performance. Therefore, an accurate forecast of the reported earnings is not necessarily consistent with analysts" main objective, particularly in the presence of a management forecast. 6 Moreover, extant anecdotal evidence suggests that earnings forecast accuracy is rarely a factor in the determination of analysts" compensation (Eccles and Crane 1988; Wall Street Journal 1991 , 2009 Forbes 1997) . Analysts are generally compensated for the commissions that they generate and their "helpfulness" to their clients, and more informative forecasts are more likely to generate trades for the brokerage firms. Extant anecdotal evidence also indicates that brokerage firms include trading incentives in their analysts" contracts (Business Week 1989 Wall Street Journal 1991 Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 2006) . 7 According to Cowen et al. (2006, p. 125) , "brokerage firms typically reward their research analysts using a single measure of performance: trading volume in the stocks they cover." It is apparent that analysts are likely to generate more trading activities by deviating from preannounced earnings than by simply following management guidance.
Consistent with this view, Irvine (2004) finds that analysts who deviate from the consensus forecast 6 Analysts also issue stock recommendations and price targets. Processing analysts" reports could be quite complicated if their recommendations and target prices were to reflect unmanaged earnings and their forecasts were to reflect managed earnings, particularly if one considers the perceived bias in analysts" recommendations. 7 The "Global Research Analyst Settlement" and other recent reforms aim at mitigating conflicts of interests in equity research. However, the reforms focus primarily on the influence of investment banks; they do not address analysts" incentives to generate trading commissions (Irvine 2004; Jackson 2005; Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 2006) . In fact, if anything, these incentives could become stronger as the research funding source shifts from underwriting to trading. generate more trading volume. Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) also suggest that an analyst is more likely to cover a firm when earnings are more difficult to predict. They argue that the analyst is likely to benefit from the potential increase in the informativeness of the forecasts and trading volume, although her forecast accuracy is likely to suffer. Similarly, by reiterating management guidance, an analyst will likely increase her forecast accuracy, but will likely generate less commission for her brokerage firm and provide less useful valuation information to her clients. By disagreeing with management, an analyst is more likely to generate disagreement among investors and, thus, trading volume for her brokerage firm.
Analysts are also likely to be motivated by the Institutional Investor All-Americans ranking, which is based on surveys of buy-side managers (i.e., institutional investors) who select sell-side analysts that they deem "most helpful." The voters are specifically asked to select analysts who have been "most helpful to you and your institution in researching U.S. equities over the past 12 months." It seems unlikely that an analyst would be considered most helpful by simply reiterating outstanding preannounced earnings, although such a strategy is likely to increase her forecast accuracy. StarMine, an analyst scoring service affiliated with Thomson Reuters, ranks analysts by forecast accuracy. However, to get a high accuracy score, an analyst must make timely estimates that are significantly different from other analysts" estimates. Therefore, even if accuracy is an analyst"s main objective, a reiteration of preannouncement earnings --when everyone else is doing the same thing --is unlikely to benefit her that much.
Finally, we find strong evidence that, on average, analysts could increase their forecast accuracy by simply confirming the preannounced earnings. However, it does not appear that analysts would add much value by pursuing such a strategy. Even worse, they could mislead some of their clients into thinking that the preannounced earnings and the forthcoming earnings correctly convey true performance, when they are actually managed. It therefore appears that any incentive system (promotion or compensation scheme) that would reward analysts for merely reiterating the same (managed) number that the managers have already preannounced would be quite irrational even if the forecasts are accurate. It also seems unlikely that someone could build a good long-term reputation as an analyst by reiterating management guidance. As Richard Wayman argues, those who adopt this strategy "may be successful for a while but they will eventually become known as followers, devoid of any original thinking." 8
How would a client know that her analyst has forecasted unmanaged earnings?
Because forecasts of unmanaged earnings are likely to be inaccurate, one might argue that, if analysts were issuing forecasts of unmanaged earnings, they would need to indicate that to their clients. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that, by default, investors expect analysts to forecast managed earnings. However, this assumption is not necessarily correct. When a firm reports an earnings surprise, investors are likely to ascertain whether the surprise is achieved through earnings management. They do not necessarily assume that the analyst forecasts already incorporate the potential earnings management.
There are actually many class-actions suits accusing managers of managing earnings to meet analyst forecasts. The academic literature also associates earnings surprises with earnings management. For instance, based on a review of the literature, Dechow and Skinner (2000, p. 248) conclude that "firms just beating benchmarks are potentially more likely to be engaging in earnings management." Moreover, it does not even seem rational to assume that analysts by default forecast managed earnings. Unless there is an outstanding management forecast, which an analyst can compare to her own forecast, it is difficult for her to know that managers are going to manage earnings in a certain direction and by a certain amount. 9 Managers have incentives to manage earnings before they trade on their own accounts, issue new shares, engage in stock-for-stock mergers, repurchase shares, receive stock options, etc. However, anticipating these events is generally very difficult. It is possible to anticipate earnings management around certain benchmarks. However, consistent with analysts" general inability to anticipate earnings management, Burgstahler and Eames (2003) find evidence that, on average, analysts forecast losses (the true performance) when it appears that managers have avoided reporting the losses through earnings management.
To provide more useful valuation information to their clients, analysts could forecast the unmanaged earnings (i.e., the true performance), as opposed to the reported (managed) numbers. In instances where stock prices are inflated through earnings management, deviating from the managers" guidance (or abstaining from revising an outstanding forecast) is certainly a much more subtle way for an analyst to convey her disagreement with managers than issuing a sell recommendation or accusing the managers of earnings manipulations (if only for the potential legal repercussions of such an accusation).
By the time of the preannouncement, the managers generally know what their earnings are. Therefore, analysts" deviations from the preannounced earnings per se can convey the analysts" beliefs about the firms" true performance. 10 9 Extant evidence suggests that analysts generally do not incorporate earnings management in their forecasts. Shane and Stock (2006) , for instance, find no evidence that analysts anticipate income deferrals by firms facing statutory tax rate decreases in the mid-1980s. Givoly, Hayn, and Yoder (2010) also find evidence suggesting that analysts are often "incapable of predicting and detecting earnings management." Furthermore, analysts do not simply provide a forecasted number; they also produce lengthy reports. When deviating from management forecasts, they often refer to their forecasting models, discuss their main assumptions, and explain why the firm"s true performance cannot be outside a certain range. Not only does the analyst deviate from the pre-announced earnings, but more importantly she does not adjust her full-year forecast after the managers report a third-quarter EPS that is consistent with the preannounced earnings. Instead, she essentially assumes that the company has shifted $0.02 from the fourth quarter to the third quarter. Brian McGough of Morgan Stanley also deviated from Hasbro"s management guidance. He specifically noted in his report: "The company gave guidance of $540-$575 million in EBITDA for 2000. But even using the most optimistic assumptions in our model, we arrive at a number closer to $500 million. In order to hit its target, we believe that the company will need to either earn higher EBIT than it guided towards, or accelerate the amortization of some of its licenses." The May 25,
report by James McIlree and Greg Walters of Tucker Anthony Sutro Capital Markets on Pinnacle
Holdings is another example of analysts deviating from management forecast and explaining clearly to their clients why they believe that the guidance does not reflect true performance. After a detailed analysis of Pinnacle"s performance, McIlree and Walters conclude: "In sum, at best, we get to the lowend of the company"s revenue guidance" and "We cannot get to EBITDA guidance either." In a March 9, 2005 research note, Barry Stouffer and Scott Schumann of BB&T Capital Markets also wrote about Landry"s Restaurant"s reported earnings: "Although Q4"04 operating EPS were a penny better than expected, the quality of fourth quarter EPS was poor." They later emphasize that they expressly titled the note "You can"t get there from here", "because using management"s general assumptions in our earnings model yields estimates that are below management guidance." We assume that analysts would be reluctant to openly accuse managers of earnings management. However, these cases indicate that analysts can be quite explicit in their disagreement with management, as to leave no doubt in their clients" minds that they cannot rely on the numbers provided by management.
It is important to note that analysts can deviate from the management"s short-term forecasts with the knowledge that managers can, and likely will, manage their activities and their accruals to achieve the earnings targets. For instance, in a July 12, 2005 report about Avon, after deviating from the management managers" strategy, they should still be able infer the analysts" beliefs about the firm"s true performance from the analysts" deviations from the preannounced earnings. guidance, Justin Hott and Michael Termezy of Bear Stearns stated: "We are less worried about an earnings miss than earnings quality. Avon has many mechanisms to achieve short-term top and bottom line targets. While we are not looking for a 2Q05 earnings miss, the company has provided some lofty targets for 2005 and beyond that could be challenged unless growth accelerates in core markets." They later added: "Historical (earnings management) mechanisms have included the temporary lowering of representative sign-up fees, which Avon briefly did at the end 2004 to $5 in the U.S., promotions and tax rate management strategies." Nonetheless, they deviated from the management guidance for the quarter.
How about clients who trade on short-term earnings news?
According to Goldman spokesman Edward Canaday, the objective of the firm is to provide information that meets their clients" investment needs (Wall Street Journal 2009). He suggests that accurate forecasts of short-term earnings are not very relevant for long-term investors. These clients are interested in information that can help them to ascertain the true underlying value of a firm. Obviously, short-term earnings information can be useful for clients who trade on short-term news. However, analysts do not necessarily target these clients with the earnings forecasts published in their regular research reports. They use other means to communicate with these clients. They provide them short-term tips through phone calls, email alerts, special gatherings, and special reports that "identify stocks they think are likely to rise or fall due to earnings announcements, the direction of the overall market or other short-term developments" (Wall Street Journal 2009). Through these means, analysts "discuss events that may have a near-term or short-term impact on a stock"s price …, even if that is a different direction from an analyst"s overall forecast." Goldman Sacks used to provide the tips selectively to "clients who have expressed interest in having the information and have short-term investment horizons," arguing that the firm "doesn't want to overload other clients with information that isn"t relevant to them." Other firms provide the information more broadly. For instance, "Morgan Stanley also generates short-term views on various stocks, which it calls "Research Tactical Ideas" and distributes widely via email and the firm"s Web site."
Research design
This section presents our main regression model and discusses issues related to the measurement of our main variables.
Regression model
We model the deviations of analyst forecasts from preannounced earnings as a function of earnings management. We do not assume that any deviation of analyst forecasts from preannounced earnings is due to earnings management. In addition to using the last management forecasts issued after the end of the fiscal quarter, when managers are likely to know what the reported number will be, we control for other factors that could affect the deviation. More specifically, we use the following model:
where DEVAF is the deviation of the last consensus analyst forecast from the preceding preannounced earnings for quarter 0 (analyst forecast minus preannounced earnings), as a percentage of price on the day prior to the preannouncement;
ABAC is abnormal accruals, our proxy for earnings management for quarter 0;
ABRET_BMA is the market-adjusted returns starting two days after the preannouncement date and ending one day before the analyst forecast date;
LOSS is a binary variable taking the value one if earnings for quarter-1 are negative and 0 otherwise;
ROA is net income for quarter-1 deflated by total assets at the beginning of quarter-1;
CHE is the change in the earnings for quarter-1 over the earnings in quarter-5 scaled by price at the beginning of quarter-1;
ABRETM3 is the market-adjusted returns over the three months ending the month prior to the earnings preannouncement month;
LOGMV is the logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of quarter 0;
BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the beginning of quarter 0;
EVOLATIL is the standard deviation of earnings (as a percentage of price at the beginning of the quarter) over the 20 quarters prior to quarter 0;
FEVOLATIL is the standard deviation of analyst forecast errors (as a percentage of price on the day prior to analyst forecast) over the 20 quarters prior to quarter 0; analyst forecast error is the difference between the last consensus analyst forecast for the quarter and the reported earnings;
COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts included in the last consensus analyst prior to the earnings announcement; and
MBIAS is the bias in the pre-announced earnings.
Analysts might deviate from the preannounced earnings because of new information released after the preannouncement. We use the stock returns between the earnings preannouncement date and the analyst forecast date (ABRET_BMA) to proxy for events occurring between the two dates. We include an indicator variable for losses (LOSS) because managers" incentives to manage investors" expectations are different when they are going to report losses than when they are going to report profits (Hwang, Jan, and Basu 1996; Brown 1997) . We also control for return-on-assets (ROA) and change in earnings (CHE) to control for the notion that analysts are more likely to issue forecasts when they are optimistic about a firm"s performance (McNichols and O"Brien 1997) . 11 We control for recent stock performance (ABRETM3) because previous studies suggest that financial distress affects managers" forecast errors (Koch 2003) and prior stock returns are associated with analyst forecast errors (Ali, Klein, and Rosenfeld 1992) . These accounting variables also control for analysts" underreaction to recent earnings information. Elgers and Lo (1994) find that prior stock returns and earnings changes are each incrementally associated with analyst forecast errors. We also include firm growth (proxied by BM) and firm size (LOGMV)
because Bamber and Cheon (1998) document that growth opportunities and firm size affect managers" forecasting behavior. These variables are also associated with analyst forecast errors (Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis 2002; Gu and Wu 2003) . We control for earnings volatility (EVOLATIL) and analyst forecast error volatility (FEVOLATIL) because volatile earnings are more difficult to predict, reducing the cost for the managers of issuing erroneous forecasts and increasing analyst forecast errors (Gu and Wu 2003) . We also control for analyst coverage (COVERAGE) because it is likely to be associated with information dissemination about a firm and the accuracy of the forecasts. We include MBIAS in the model to control for the potential bias in the pre-announced earnings. We discuss our proxy for MBIAS in the next section.
If analysts deviate from preannounced earnings because they intend to forecast true performance instead of the reported (managed) earnings, then positive (negative) deviations should increase in the extent to which the firms manage earnings downwards (upwards). Therefore, we expect  1 to be negative.
Variable measurement
Below, we describe the main variables used in our analysis: earnings management and analyst forecast deviations. We also explain how we control for potential biases in the pre-announced earnings.
Abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings management
Following the extant literature, we proxy for earnings management by abnormal accruals (ABAC), using a modified version of Jones" (1991) model. We estimate the following regression for each calendar quarter and for each two-digit SIC code using all firms that have the necessary data on Compustat:
j=1 11 ABRETM3, LOSS, ROA, and CHE are highly correlated, but this does not constitute a problem since we are not making inferences based on the coefficients on these variables. Our results are also qualitatively similar if we remove some or all of these variables from the model.
where TA is the total quarterly accrual; Q is a binary variable taking the value of one for fiscal quarter j and zero otherwise; ∆SALES is the quarterly change in sales; PPE is property, plant, and equipment; LTA is the lag of total accruals; ASSET is total assets at the beginning of the quarter; and  is the regression residual. Total accruals are earnings before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows plus extraordinary items/discontinued operations that affect cash flows. All the variables, including the quarterly intercepts, are scaled by assets at the beginning of the quarter. We winzorize the top and bottom one-percentiles of the deflated TA, ∆SALES, PPE, and LTA. In estimating model (2), we require at least 20 observations in each industry in a given quarter. Since we scale all variables by total assets, the explanatory variable, ASSET, is transformed into a column of ones, which allows us to estimate the model with a standard intercept. Equation (2) is identical to the model used by Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) .
We adjust the abnormal accruals for performance, as suggested by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) . Consistent with Louis (2004), for each calendar quarter and for each two-digit SIC code industry, we create five portfolios by sorting the data into quintiles of ROA measured four quarters prior to the quarter of the portfolio formation. The abnormal accrual for a given firm is the respective residual from the abnormal accrual model for that firm minus the median residual of the matched portfolio.
Note that the accruals are for the specific quarters for which earnings are forecasted. The accruals are reported to the market at the earnings announcement, at the earliest, and therefore are not known to the analysts at the time of their forecasts. However, as mentioned earlier, we do not assume that analysts forecast the reported earnings and then back out the expected earnings management. We simply assume that analysts form their own estimates of a firm"s performance using their own forecasting models, and those who want to convey to their clients useful valuation inputs deviate from the preannounced earnings if they believe that the preannounced earnings do not reflect true performance.
Abnormal accruals may not represent the exact amount of value-irrelevant earnings management.
First, it is only an estimate of discretionary accruals, which is noisy even after adjusting for performance (Dechow et al. 2011) . Second, managers can use means other than accruals to manage earnings. 12 Our estimated abnormal accruals measure is only a proxy for earnings management. To the extent that it captures earnings management, the direction of its association with the deviation of analyst forecasts from preannounced earnings (DEVAF) should be generally consistent with the direction of the association between earnings management and DEVAF. To ensure that we indeed capture the effect of earnings management, we replicate the analysis using restatement data from AuditAnalytics.
Analyst forecast deviations
We measure analyst forecasts as the last consensus analyst forecasts after the earnings preannouncements (the last management forecast after the end of the fiscal quarter) that are issued at least three days prior to the earnings announcement. The average number of days between the preannouncement date and the last consensus analyst forecast date is 5.73. We use the stock returns between the preannouncement date and the analyst forecast date to control for the effects of events occurring between the two dates.
The consensus forecast includes observations with zero individual forecast revisions. Our view is that, if an analyst has an outstanding forecast and managers subsequently make a preannouncement that differs from her forecast because they will manage earnings, the analyst is less likely to revise her forecast if her objective is to provide valuation input to her clients. Therefore, it is important to include the zero forecasts revisions in the analysis. It is important to note that, if First Call has not received confirmation of the last estimate, its editors normally call the brokerage firm to verify whether the stock is still being covered. If it is not, the estimate is excluded from the consensus forecast. An analyst could be busy and not have time to do the necessary research to revise her forecasts. However, adjusting a forecast towards the preannounced earnings is one of the least demanding tasks that an analyst could perform and one that is likely to have the most impact on forecast accuracy. If an analyst"s primary objective is to be accurate, it is difficult to conceive that she would find time to do the research and issue a forecast but not enough time to update the forecast in response to a subsequent management forecast. Nonetheless, we also analyze the association between abnormal accruals and the deviation using only individual analyst forecasts issued after the preannouncement.
Analysts often exclude non-recurring items from their forecasts. However, the actual earnings, the analyst forecasts, and the preannounced earnings used in our study refer to some form of "street earnings" from First Call, which reports all three earnings numbers on a comparable basis. It is important to note that forecast accuracy has actually been measured in the literature by comparing analyst forecasts and actual earnings numbers reported by First Call, the Institutional Brokers" Estimate System (IBES), or
Zacks. We use First Call in this study because we want the actual earnings, the analyst forecasts, and the preannounced earnings to be from the same source and First Call is the only one of the three databases that provides preannounced earnings. It is standard in the literature to compare the actual earnings, the analyst forecast, and the management forecast numbers provided by First Call (see, e.g., Feng and McVay 2010; Hutton, Lee, and Shu 2012) . Our reading of analyst reports indicates that analysts leave no doubt that they are forecasting the same numbers as the managers. As the examples provided in Section 2 show, analysts routinely compare their forecasts with the managers" forecasts and explain any deviation from the managers" forecasts. They often discuss the assumptions under which the managers" forecasts would hold. As we explain earlier, when they cannot replicate the managers" guidance under reasonable assumptions, they often say so and deviate from the managers" guidance.
Our assumption that First Call reports actual earnings, analyst forecasts, and preannounced earnings on the same basis implies that the difference between actual earnings and preannounced earnings would be a surprise to the market, as opposed some noise created by discrepancies in the First Call"s definitions of actual earnings and preannounced earnings. Consistent with our assumption, untabulated results show a significantly positive association between the abnormal return over the three days centered on the earnings announcement and the surprise relative to the preannounced earnings (actual earnings minus preannounced earnings scaled by price), with a t−value of 3.76.
Managers' incentives to issue forecasts that differ from the actual earnings
Managers and analysts are allegedly engaged in a game, whereby managers walk analyst forecasts to beatable levels and inflate earnings to meet the forecasts when the analysts do not cooperate (Fox, 1997; Wall Street Journal 1997a , 1997b and Business Week 1999) . We adjust for managers" efforts to walk analyst forecasts down by controlling for the bias in the pre-announced earnings (MBIAS), which is proxied by the preannouncement error (preannounced earnings minus reported earnings) of the current quarter (PAE). Note that there should be a relation between the preannouncement error and the deviation only if analysts adjust for the potential bias in the preannounced earnings. 13 One advantage with using the error in the current preannounced earnings is that it is an exact measure of the actual error. However, it has some potential problems. One concern is that analysts are unlikely to perfectly anticipate the actual error. To address this concern, we also use lagged management forecast errors. However, preannounced earnings are not available every quarter and the use of the lag substantially reduces the sample size. We mitigate the sample attrition problem by using the average of the management forecast error over the past eight quarters (APPAE), which we set to the sample average for firms with no management forecast over the eight quarters. We use the last quarterly management forecasts, whether they are issued before or after the end of the fiscal quarter. The pre-announcement error is likely to be different for firms preannouncing for the first time. However, our inferences hold even if we include both the average of the past management forecast errors and the current actual pre-announcement error in the model.
To further ensure that our findings are not an artifact of this potential game between managers and analysts, we also test the robustness of our results to controlling for cases where analysts might be 13 Consider two firms (U and B) that have actual earnings of $1.2; the managers of Firm U pre-announce $1.2 (they are unbiased) and the managers of Firm B pre-announce $1.0 (so that they can beat the forecast). If analysts do not adjust for the bias and forecast $1.2 for Firm U and $1.0 for Firm B, then there will be no correlation between the errors in the preannounced earnings and the deviations of the analyst forecasts from the preannounced earnings. In contrast, if analysts adjust for the bias and forecast $1.2 for both firms, then there will be a negative correlation between the errors and the deviations.
resisting managers" effort to walk down their forecasts to beatable levels and those where managers might inflate earnings at the last minute to meet the forecasts of disobliging analysts. See Section 5.4 for detail.
Sample selection, descriptive statistics, and simple correlations
Below we describe our sample selection process, and present descriptive statistics and simple correlations for the variables used in our main regression model.
Sample selection
We conduct our analysis over the 1995-2006 period. We compute abnormal returns over the year after the earnings announcement. Because the sample ends in 2006, our results are not affected by the recent financial crisis.
To be included in our primary analysis, a firm has first to meet the following criteria: 1) the actual quarterly earnings, the quarterly earnings preannouncements, and the quarterly consensus analyst forecasts are available on First Call; and 2) the earnings announcement dates for both the current and the prior quarters are available on Compustat. There are 4,141 firm-quarters that satisfy these criteria. Some of the control variables used in our regression models have missing observations on either First Call, CRSP, or COMPUSTAT. For our main regression, there are a total of 3,620 firm-quarters that have complete observations. that exceed the preannounced earnings to pressure managers to report higher earnings. It is also consistent with the notion that managers tend to issue forecasts that they can beat, which could induce analysts to deviate from the preannounced earnings to account for the potential bias. The preannouncement error [PAE (preannounced earnings minus actual earnings)] is negative. The mean (median) PAE is -0.041% (−0.021%) of price, which is consistent with the notion that managers tend to forecast numbers that they can beat.
Descriptive statistics and simple correlation for the variables used in the regression
At first glance, the positive average deviation might seem inconsistent with the notion that some analysts forecast unmanaged earnings. The effect of earnings management has to reverse. Therefore, it might appear that, even if the deviation is negatively associated with earnings management, the average effect of earnings management on the deviation would be zero. However, this is not necessarily the case.
Analysts are more likely to differentiate managed from unmanaged earnings, and therefore more likely to deviate from preannounced earnings, when the managed amount is large. Managers often inflate earnings by relatively small amounts and deflate them by large amounts through "big baths." Accordingly, analysts are more likely to detect intended downward earnings management (big bath) impounded in the preannounced earnings than intended upward earnings management. This argument is consistent with Abarbanell and Lehavy"s (2003) observation that, in general, the analyst forecast error distribution includes relatively high incidences of large positive forecast errors and small negative forecast errors. 15 In our sample, the number of small negative earnings management amounts is greater than the number of large positive earnings management amounts. However, because the small amounts are more difficult to detect and positive earnings management amounts are more likely to be small, analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings and analyst forecast errors are likely to be zero for a relatively large number of firms with positive earnings management. This situation is likely to result in both the deviations and the analyst forecast errors displaying a zero median but a positive mean.
The statistics for the abnormal accruals (ABAC) are consistent with the notion that managers tend to inflate earnings by relatively small amounts and deflate earnings by large amounts. The average ABAC is essentially zero (0.0003) by construction, whereas the median is 0.0017, which means that the distribution is skewed to the left. The skewness measure is −0.0024, which is significant at the 1% level using D'Agostino and Tietjen"s (1973) test.
We report simple correlations in Table 2 . Consistent with the conjecture that analysts could deviate from preannounced earnings to provide incrementally useful valuation information to their clients, the correlation between the abnormal accruals and the deviations of analyst forecasts from preannounced 15 For internal consistency, we define forecast error as forecast minus actual. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) use actual minus forecast. Under Abarbanell and Lehavy"s (2003) definition, the analyst forecast error distribution includes relatively high incidences of large negative forecast errors and small positive forecast errors.
is negative. The deviation is also negatively correlated with prior performance, as measured by negative earnings (LOSS), return-on-assets (ROA), and market-adjusted returns over the previous three months (ABRETM3). It is also negatively correlated with size (LOGMV), analyst coverage (COVERAGE), and the preannouncement error (PAE); and positively correlated with book-to-market (BM), past earnings volatility (EVOLATIL), and past forecast error volatility (FEVOLATIL). We control for these variables in our regression analysis.
Regression results
This section reports results for the following analyses: (1) the association between abnormal accruals and analyst deviations using the consensus forecast; (2) Table 3 reports the main results on the association between abnormal accruals and analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings. Consistent with the conjecture that analysts could deviate from preannouncements of distorted earnings to provide incrementally useful valuation information to their clients, we find a significantly negative association between abnormal accruals and deviations of analyst forecasts from preannounced earnings. Under Column (1), where we control for the current quarter preannouncement error, the coefficient on abnormal accruals, ABAC, is −0.676, with an adjusted t-value of -3.32.
Association between abnormal accruals and analyst deviations using the consensus forecast
As expected, the coefficient on the preannouncement error [PAE (preannounced earnings minus reported earnings)], which proxies for the potential bias in the preannouncement, is negative. We replicate the analysis by controlling for the potential bias in the preannouncement using the average management forecast error over the past eight quarters. The results, reported under Column (2) and Column (3) of Table 3 , are qualitatively similar to those reported under Column (1). When we proxy for management forecast bias by the average management forecast error over the past eight quarters, the coefficient on abnormal accruals, ABAC, is -0.584, with an adjusted t-value of -2.94; and the coefficient on the management forecast error is statistically insignificant. The coefficient (t−value) is -0.681 (-3.33) when we control for both the actual preannouncement error and the average management forecast error over the past eight quarters. Untabulated results show that the coefficient (t-value) is -0.572 (-2.89) if we do not control for management forecast bias at all. Overall, the results suggest that analyst deviations from preannounced earnings generally depend on the extent to which firms manage earnings.
Note again that the negative association between the deviation and abnormal accruals is inconsistent with the notion that analysts would deviate from earnings preannouncements to pressure managers to report higher earnings. Under this alternative explanation, the association would be positive.
The lower the preannounced earnings are below the analyst forecasts, the more the managers would have to inflate earnings to meet the analyst forecasts, which would result in a positive association between abnormal accruals and the deviations. 
Association between abnormal accrual and deviations using individual analyst forecasts
As explained earlier, it is important to include the zero forecasts revisions in the analysis. If an analyst has an outstanding forecast and managers subsequently make a preannouncement that differs from her forecast because they will manage earnings, the analyst should be less likely to revise her forecast if her objective is to provide valuation input to her clients. Removing those analysts who do not revise their forecasts would bias against this hypothesis. In addition, it is not obvious that there are alternative rational reasons why earnings management would be related to the deviation when analysts do not revise their forecasts after the preannouncement. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we analyze the association between abnormal accruals and the deviation of analyst forecasts from preannounced earnings using only individual analysts who issue forecasts after the earnings preannouncements to compute the firms" average analyst forecasts.
The results, reported in Table 4 , are again consistent with the notion that analyst deviations from the preannounced earnings depend on the extent to which a firm manages earnings. The coefficient (t-value) on ABAC is -0.281 (-3.06) when we control for the current quarter preannouncement error, -0.239 (−2.51) when we control for the potential bias in the preannouncement using the average management forecast error over the past eight quarters, and -0.289 (−3.12) when we control for both the actual preannouncement error and the average management forecast error over the past eight quarters.
The coefficients in Table 4 are much smaller than those reported in Table 3 , where we use First Call consensus. The reason is that those analysts who issue forecasts after the preannouncement are more likely those who are responsive to the preannouncement. On average, the forecasts for this group get closer to the preannounced earnings, reducing then the deviation (our dependent variable) and resulting in smaller coefficient estimates. For instance, as reported in Table 1 , the mean deviation is 0.066% when we use First Call consensus forecasts; in contrast, it is only -0.006% when we construct the consensus using only individual analysts who issue forecasts after the preannouncement. Similarly, the minimum and maximum deviations are -1.308% and 3.294% when we use First Call consensus forecasts, but only −1.185% and 1.408% when we construct the consensus using only individual analysts who issue forecasts after the preannouncement. However, it is worth noting that, while the coefficient estimates are smaller, the t-values are similar and the inferences exactly the same.
Association between restatement-related misstatements and analyst deviations
There are concerns that estimated abnormal accruals may not sufficiently capture earnings management. It is not obvious why abnormal accruals and the deviation would have the strong association that we document if the abnormal accruals do not capture earnings management. However, one could argue that the association could be spurious. Therefore, to further ensure that we capture the effect of earnings management, we replicate the analysis using restatement data from AuditAnalytics.
AuditAnalytics indicates whether a restatement is income increasing or decreasing and the period that is affected; however, it does not provide the amount of the restatement. Accordingly, we create an indicator variable RESTATE, which takes the value -0.5 if a restatement results in an increase in the earnings of the restated period (i.e., the reported earnings were understated), 0.5 if it results in a decrease in the earnings of the restated period (i.e., the reported earnings were overstated), and 0 if there is no restatement.
Consistent with the notion that analyst deviations from the preannounced earnings depend on the extent to which a firm manages earnings, the results reported in Table 5 show that the deviation has a significantly negative association with RESTATE. The coefficient (t-value) on RESTATE is -0.100 (-3.25) when we control for the current quarter preannouncement error, -0.076 (−2.23) when we control for the potential bias in the preannouncement using the average management forecast error over the past eight quarters, and -0.101 (−3.25) when we control for both the actual preannouncement error and the average management forecast error over the past eight quarters.
The potential effect of the strategic "earnings game" between managers and analysts
Prior studies indicate that managers have incentives to meet or beat analyst forecasts (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002) . Comments in the financial press and extant empirical studies also suggest that managers use earnings guidance to walk analyst forecasts down to beatable levels (Fox 1997; Wall Street Journal 1997a , 1997b Business Week 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 2004; and Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki 2006) . As we explain earlier, this game does not explain why the consensus analyst forecast would be less accurate than the preannounced earnings or why the deviation would be negatively related with earnings management. However, it might be that our results are due to analysts" resistance to the managers" efforts to walk down their forecasts to beatable levels or to pressure on the managers to inflate earnings at the last minute to meet overly optimistic forecasts by disobliging analysts. We analyze these two possibilities in this section.
Are the results due to analyst resistance to the managers?
To ensure that our inferences are not due to the potential strategic game played by analysts and managers, we create a binary variable, RESIST, which takes the value one if analysts might have been resisting managers" efforts to walk down their forecasts and zero otherwise. Analysts are deemed to have been resisting managers" efforts to walk down their forecasts if (1) the preannounced earnings are lower than the preceding consensus analyst forecasts and (2) the last consensus analyst forecasts issued after the earnings preannouncement remain at least as high as the last consensus analyst forecasts issued prior to the earnings preannouncement. We then estimate the following model:
The results, which we report in Column (1) of Table 6 , show that the association between DEVAF and ABAC for those cases where the analysts are unlikely to have been resisting the managers,  1 , is significantly negative (−0.638 with a t-value of −3.19). It is very close to the −0.676 that we report in Column (1) of Table 3 . The incremental effect of those cases where analysts might have been resisting the managers,  3 , is large but not statistically significant (t-value = −0.43), which indicates that our inferences hold even for those cases where analysts are less likely to have been resisting managers" efforts to walk down their forecasts to beatable levels.
Are the results due to analyst pressure on the managers to inflate earnings?
If the analyst forecasts are indeed too high and the analysts do not respond to the managers" efforts to walk down their forecasts, then the managers could ultimately have to resort to earnings management to meet the analyst forecasts. Analysts allegedly exert pressure on managers to report higher earnings (Fuller and Jensen 2002; Beyer 2008) , presumably to keep stock prices high and create trading volume for their brokerage firms. As Fuller and Jensen (2002) explain, in the game between managers and analysts, the latter sometimes have the last word. Managers can be forced to inflate earnings at the last minute to meet overly optimistic forecasts by disobliging analysts and avoid the punishment associated with missing analyst forecasts. We assume that, at the time of a preannouncement (i.e., after the end of a fiscal quarter), managers generally know what earnings number they are likely to report. An implicit assumption of our study then is that managers include in their preannounced earnings the abnormal accruals they will include in the reported earnings. However, this assumption will not hold if the managers decide at the last minute to inflate earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts because the analysts do not respond to the managers" effort to walk down their forecasts.
To ensure that our results are not driven by cases where managers might inflate earnings at the last minute to meet the forecasts of disobliging analysts, we create a binary variable, PRESSURE, which takes the value one if the managers might have been pressured to inflate earnings at the last minute to meet overly optimistic forecasts by disobliging analysts and zero otherwise. Managers are deemed most likely to inflate earnings at the last minute to meet overly optimistic forecasts by disobliging analysts if
(1) the last consensus analyst forecasts issued after the earnings preannouncements are higher than the preannounced earnings and (2) the managers would have missed the analyst forecasts if they did not inflate earnings (as indicated by the abnormal accruals). 16 We then estimate the following model:
The results, which we report in Column (2) of Table 6 , show that the association between DEVAF and ABAC for those cases where the managers were less likely to have been pressured to inflate earnings at the last minute to meet overly optimistic forecasts by disobliging analysts,  1 , is significantly negative (t-value = −3.54). If anything, the coefficient (−0.803) is larger than the −0.676 that we report in Table 3 . Accordingly,  3 , which captures the incremental effect of those cases where the managers might have been pressured to inflate earnings at the last minute to meet overly optimistic forecasts by disobliging 16 Abnormal accruals are scaled by lagged assets, and forecasted and reported earnings are scaled by price. Therefore, when estimating whether managers would have missed the analyst forecasts if they did not inflate earnings, we put the abnormal accruals and the forecasted and reported earnings on the same scale by multiplying the abnormal accruals by lagged assets and dividing them by market value. We deem that managers would have missed the analyst forecasts if they did not inflate earnings if the earnings surprise is nonnegative and the surprise minus the adjusted abnormal accruals is negative.
analysts, is actually positive (t-value = 1.41). Hence, our inferences are unlikely to be driven by lastminute earnings inflation by managers to meet overly optimistic forecasts by disobliging analysts.
Controlling for the effects of both analyst resistance and analyst pressure
We then combine model (3) and model (4) to simultaneously control for the effects of RESIST and PRESSURE. More specifically, we use the following model:
The coefficient on ABAC,  1 , captures the association between DEVAF and ABAC for those cases where the analysts were less likely to have been resisting the managers and the managers were less likely to have been pressured to inflate earnings at the last minute to meet overly optimistic forecasts by disobliging analysts. The results, which we report in Column (3) of Table 6 , show that  1 is significantly negative (tvalue = −3.35). Taken together, the results in Tables 6 indicate that our inferences are unlikely to be due to the potential "game" between analysts and managers. 17
The effect of deviations on analyst forecast errors
Knowing the managers" incentives to preannounce earnings that are lower than the actual earnings, to reduce their forecast errors, analysts could choose to deviate from the preannounced earnings by issuing forecasts that exceed the outstanding management forecasts. We therefore analyze whether analyst deviations from preannounced earnings reduce analyst forecast errors using the following model: 17 Managers who play the "earnings game" are probably more likely to guide analysts on a somewhat regular basis. Others may guide occasionally for reasons other than meeting quarterly earnings forecasts on a regular basis. For instance, a firm may not be a regular guider, but could issue guidance prior to a corporate event such as a stock-forstock merger so that it can execute the transaction on more favorable terms. For these guiders, the objective is not necessarily to walk down analyst forecasts. In the case of a stock-for-stock merger, for instance, the objective is actually to manage the analyst forecasts up (see, e.g., Brockman and Martin 2010) . In addition, analysts are more likely to be familiar with a guider and to know that an earnings guidance is biased in a certain way (and to correct for the bias), when the guider issues earnings forecasts on a regular basis than when it does so on an occasional basis. If our results are driven by the "game" between analysts and managers, then we would expect them to be at least stronger for the regular guiders than for the occasional guiders. Therefore, as an additional robustness test, we compare the association between DEVAF and ABAC across occasional and regular guiders. A firm is deemed an occasional guider if the managers did not provide guidance in the previous year and a regular guider if the managers provided guidance in the previous year. Untabulated results show that the association between DEVAF and ABAC for the occasional guiders is significantly negative, with an adjusted t-value of −2.53. The incremental effect of the regular guiders is insignificantly positive, which is contrary to what we would expect if our results were driven by cases where managers engage in the "earnings game" to meet analyst forecasts on a regular basis.
where ABS_AFE, the proxy for forecast accuracy, is the absolute value of the analyst forecast error and ABS_DEVAF is the absolute value of the deviation of the analyst forecasts from the preannounced earnings. Both are expressed as a percentage of price on the day prior to the preannouncement. The other variables are defined as before. If analyst deviations from preannounced earnings reduce analyst forecast errors, we expect  1 to be negative. If, instead, it increases the forecast errors, we expect  1 to be positive.
The results are reported in Table 7 . We find a very strong positive association between the absolute values of the forecast errors and the absolute values of the deviations. The t-values for the coefficient on the absolute values of the deviation is 17.50. Therefore, on average, analysts do not increase their forecast accuracy by deviating from preannounced earnings. If this is their objective, then it does not seem that they have succeeded. The results clearly indicate that, on average, analysts could improve their forecast accuracy by reiterating the outstanding earnings preannouncements. This finding also holds if we control for the average management forecast error over the past eight quarters (APPAE) or simply exclude PAE, the preannouncement error, from the model.
The stock price effect of analyst deviations
To analyze the stock price effect of the analyst deviations, we could estimate the association between the deviations and the abnormal stock returns around the analyst forecasts. However, this procedure is not practical because many analysts revise their forecasts on the day of the earnings preannouncement or the day after. Therefore, it is difficult to separate the effect of the deviation from the effect of the preannouncement. To capture the stock price impact of the deviation, we instead analyze the effect of the interaction between the preannouncement and the deviation. Earnings preannouncement surprises should positively affect stock prices. If analyst deviations from earnings preannouncements are effective, then they should mitigate the market reaction to the preannouncements. Therefore, we expect the positive association between the preannouncement surprise and the abnormal return around the preannouncement and the analyst forecast to decrease with the deviation. To test this conjecture, we use the following regression model:
where CAR is the market-adjust return from the day before the earnings preannouncement to the day after the consensus forecast date; and PAS, the preannouncement surprise, is the difference between the preannounced earnings and the last preceding analyst consensus earnings forecast, scaled by price prior to the preannouncement.
The results are reported in Table 8 . The regression intercept is strongly negative, which is likely due to the fact that managers are more likely to preannounce earnings when they have bad news. As expected,  1 , the coefficient on the preannouncement surprise (PAS) is significantly positive. Consistent with the notion that the deviation tempers the preannouncement effect,  3 , the coefficient on the interaction between the preannouncement surprise and the deviation is significantly negative.
The association between analyst deviations and earnings persistence
Thus far, we have established an association between analyst deviations from preannounced earnings and abnormal accruals. However, all abnormal accruals are not created equal. For instance, some abnormal accruals can be due to managerial opportunism whereas others can be related to favorable information about future performance, resulting in cross-sectional differences in the persistence of the abnormal accruals. In addition, Barth and Hutton (2004) find that, in fulfilling their role as information intermediaries, analysts are able to distinguish between high and low accrual persistence. Therefore, the probability that analysts would deviate from preannounced earnings to communicate more useful valuation information to their clients should depend on the persistence of the abnormal accruals.
Accordingly, we expect abnormal accruals to have a weaker association with future earnings for cases where the analysts deviate from the preannounced earnings than for those cases where they do not deviate. To test this conjecture, we use a design similar to Sloan"s (1996) . More specifically, we estimate the following models:
where E is quarterly earnings before extraordinary items; NDE, quarterly non-discretionary earnings, is earnings (E) minus abnormal accruals (ABAC); and d is a binary variable taking the value one if analysts deviate from the preannounced earnings and zero otherwise.
The results reported in Table 9 are consistent with our conjecture. As expected, the abnormal accruals are less persistent than the non-discretionary earnings, whether the analysts deviate from the preannounced earnings or not. However, the F-statistics for comparing the persistence of two earnings components is 112.45 for the cases where the analysts deviate from the preannounced earnings, whereas it is only 6.64 for those cases where the analysts do not deviate. Moreover, while the persistence of nondiscretionary earnings is virtually the same across the cases where the analysts deviate from the preannounced earnings and the cases where the analysts do not deviate, the persistence of the abnormal accruals is significantly lower for the cases where the analysts deviate from the preannounced earnings. 18
The impact of analyst deviations on abnormal accrual mispricing
Finally, we examine the impact of analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings on the abnormal accrual mispricing. Prior studies suggest that investors overprice (abnormal) accruals (Sloan 1996; Xie 2001) . They find a negative association between (abnormal) accruals and abnormal returns over the year after the earnings announcement. Xie (2001) , in particular, suggests that investors are misled by accrual management. In Table 9 , we find that abnormal accruals are less persistent for those cases where analysts deviate from the preannounced earnings than for those cases where they do not deviate. Therefore, to the extent that the (abnormal) accrual anomaly is driven by the differential persistence of the earnings components, as suggested by Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) , we would expect accrual mispricing to be more pronounced for those cases where analysts deviate from the preannounced earnings. However, if analysts deviate from preannounced (managed) earnings to provide incrementally useful valuation information to their clients and if the strategy is successful, then the deviation should reduce the abnormal accruals mispricing. That is, the negative association between abnormal accruals and future abnormal returns could actually be lower when the analyst deviation corrects for the potential forthcoming earnings management impounded in the preannounced earnings.
To test our conjecture that analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings mitigate the abnormal accrual mispricing, we use the following regression model:
where AR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return over the year starting the month after the quarterly earnings announcement, using the Fama-French-momentum four-factor benchmarking model; 19 ABACQ is abnormal accruals quintiles scaled to range from −0.5 (for the bottom quintile) and 0.5 (for the top quintile); DEV1 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if ABAC is in the top quintile and DEVAF (analyst forecast minus preannounced earnings) is negative or ABAC is in the bottom quintile and DEVAF is positive, and 0 otherwise. We focus on observations in the top and bottom 20 percentiles of abnormal accruals to increase the probability that analysts would be able to determine when the numbers that the managers intend to report are likely to substantially deviate from the true earnings numbers. The results preannounced earnings, whereas it is only 20.52 for those cases where the analysts do not deviate. The persistence of the abnormal accruals is significantly lower for the cases where the analysts deviate from the preannounced earnings than for the cases where the analysts do not deviate (0.286 versus 0.481), with an F-value of 22.59. 19 The model is estimated over a maximum of 60 months ending one year prior to the earnings announcement month. The model parameters are used to compute the abnormal returns over the 12 months after the earnings announcement month. Each firm"s raw return is adjusted by its conditional expected return based on its risk factor loadings.
can be interpreted in terms of the hedge-portfolio returns from a trading strategy consisting of taking long positions in firms in the bottom abnormal accrual quintile and short positions in those in the top quintile.
We include the logarithm of market value (LOGMV) and book-to-market (BM) in the model, although AR is already adjusted for size and book-to-market. We estimate the model with and without these two variables. We also estimate a model where we interact LOGMV and BM with ABACQ.
The variable DEV1 takes the value 1 when analyst deviations from the preannounced earnings result in forecasts that are closer to the true (unmanaged) earnings than the preannounced earnings are. If analysts deviate from preannounced earnings to convey their best estimates of unmanaged earnings and if the strategy is effective, then not only should DEVAF be negatively related to the abnormal accruals, but the abnormal accrual mispricing should also decrease with DEV1. That is, the deviation effect should counteract the effect of the earnings management impounded in the preannounced earnings, mitigating then the abnormal accrual mispricing. Therefore, we expect the coefficient on ABACQ ( 1 ) to be negative, consistent with the (abnormal) accrual anomaly, and the coefficient on ABACQ*DEV1 ( 5 ) to be positive.
The main effect,  1 , reflects the hedge-portfolio return for those cases where the deviation effect does not counteract the abnormal accrual effect and  5 reflects the incremental effect for those cases where it counteracts the effect.
The results are reported in Table 10 under Column (1). We report results for three different model (2) and (3), where we control for size and book-to-market.
In equation (9), we compare the differential portfolio returns across those cases where analyst deviations from the preannounced earnings counteract the potential earnings management effect and the rest of the sample. However, a more powerful specification is to compare the differential portfolio return across cases where the deviations counteract the abnormal accrual effect and cases where they aggravate the effect. Accordingly, we estimate the following model: In this specification, the coefficient on ABACQ ( 1 ) reflects the hedge-portfolio return for those cases where the deviation effect neither counteracts nor aggravates the abnormal accrual effect, and the coefficient on ABACQ*DEV2 ( 5 ) reflects the difference in the hedge-portfolio returns across cases where the deviations counteract the abnormal accrual effect and cases where they aggravate the effect.
Again, consistent with the (abnormal) accrual anomaly, we expect  1 to be negative. If analysts deviate from preannounced earnings to convey their best estimates of unmanaged earnings and the strategy is effective, then the negative association between abnormal accruals and future returns should at least be less when the effect of the deviation counteracts the abnormal accrual effect than when it reinforces it.
Hence, we expect  5 to be positive.
The results are reported in Table 10 under Column (2). Again, we report results for three different model specifications. Under Model (4), the coefficient on ABACQ is -0.094, for a hedge-portfolio return of 9.4%, which is in line with extant evidence on the abnormal accrual anomaly. (5) and (6), where we control for size and bookto-market.
The evidence is quite remarkable. We find that analysts are more likely to deviate from preannounced earnings as the persistence of the abnormal accruals decreases and, yet, no evidence of abnormal accrual mispricing for those cases where analysts deviate from preannounced earnings. These findings strongly indicate that the deviation mitigates the abnormal accrual mispricing. Combined with our prior evidence that analysts" deviations from the preannounced earnings generally result into forecasts that are closer to the true (unmanaged) earnings than the preannounced earnings, they suggest that, by deviating from preannounced earnings, analysts increase the informativeness of their forecasts.
Conclusion
We analyze whether analysts sacrifice forecast accuracy for informativeness by examining: (1) the association between analysts" deviations from management guidance and earnings management (proxied by abnormal accruals and restatement-related misstatements) and (2) the effect of the deviations on abnormal accrual mispricing. We find strong evidence that analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings (analyst forecasts minus preannounced earnings) are negatively associated with abnormal accruals. We also find that analysts are more likely to deviate from earnings preannouncements when the reported earnings include misstatements that ultimately lead to restatements. These findings strongly suggest that analysts likely deviate from the preannounced earnings to correct for perceived earnings management. We also show that, although the analysts" deviations from the preannounced earnings reduce their forecast accuracy, they improve the informativeness of the forecasts. More specifically, they bring the analyst forecasts closer to the true (unmanaged) earnings number and reduce accruals mispricing.
Overall, our findings have important implications about what analysts forecast, the usefulness of their forecasts, and their forecasting behavior in general. They indicate that the average analyst earnings forecast contains useful incremental valuation information over management forecasts. More importantly, they suggest that accurate analyst earnings forecasts are not always desirable and that analysts sometimes sacrifice accuracy to improve the informativeness of their forecasts. DEVAF is the last consensus analyst earnings forecast minus the preannounced earning for quarter 0 scaled by price on the day prior to the earnings preannouncement; ABAC is abnormal accruals, our proxy for earnings management for quarter 0; ABRET_BMA is the market-adjusted returns starting two days after the preannouncement date and ending one day before the analyst forecast date; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value one if earnings for quarter-1 are negative and 0 otherwise; ROA (return on assets) is net income for quarter-1 deflated by total assets at the beginning of quarter-1; CHE is the change in the earnings for quarter-1 over the earnings in quarter-5 scaled by price at the beginning of quarter-1; ABRETM3 is the market-adjusted returns over the three months ending the month prior to the preannouncement month; LOGMV is the logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of quarter 0; BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the beginning of quarter 0; EVOLATIL is the standard deviation of earnings (deflated by the beginning of quarter price) over the 20 quarters prior to quarter 0; FEVOLATIL is the standard deviation of analyst forecast errors (deflated by price on the trading day prior to analyst forecast) over the 20 quarters prior to quarter 0; analyst forecast error is the difference between the last consensus analyst forecast for the quarter and the reported earnings; COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts included in the last consensus analyst forecast prior to the earnings announcement; and PAE, preannouncement error, is preannounced earnings minus reported earnings for the quarter, deflated by price on the day prior to the earnings preannouncement. RESIST is a binary variable that takes the value one if the analysts might have been resisting managers" efforts to walk down their forecasts and zero otherwise (analysts are deemed to have been resisting managers" efforts to walk down their forecasts if (1) the preannounced earnings are lower than the preceding consensus analyst forecasts and (2) the last consensus analyst forecasts issued after the earnings preannouncement remain at least as high as the last consensus analyst forecasts issued prior to the earnings preannouncement); PRESSURE is a binary variable that takes the value one if the managers might have been pressured to inflate earnings at the last minute to meet overly optimistic forecasts by disobliging analysts and zero otherwise (managers are deemed most likely to inflate earnings at the last minute to meet overly optimistic forecasts by disobliging analysts if (1) the last consensus analyst forecasts issued after the earnings preannouncements are higher than the preannounced earnings and (2) the managers would have missed the analyst forecasts if they did not inflate earnings (as indicated by the abnormal accruals)). The other variables are defined as in ABS_AFE, the proxy for forecast accuracy, is the absolute value of AFE, the difference between the reported earnings and the last consensus analyst forecasts after the earnings preannouncement, as a percentage of price on the day prior to the preannouncement; and ABS_DEVAF is the absolute value of DEVAF, the deviation of the average analyst forecast from the preceding preannounced earnings for the quarter, as a percentage of price on the day prior to the preannouncement. The variables are defined as in CAR is the market adjust abnormal return measured from the day before the earnings preannouncement to the day after the consensus forecast date; PAS, the preannouncement surprise is the difference between the preannounced earnings and the last preceding analysts" consensus earnings forecast, as a percentage of the last price prior to the preannouncement; and DEVAF, the deviation of the average analyst forecast from the preceding preannounced earnings for the quarter, as a percentage of price on the day prior to the preannouncement. The t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at firm level. Adjusted R 2 0.077 where E is quarterly earnings before extraordinary items; NDE, quarterly non-discretionary earnings is earnings (E) minus abnormal accruals (ABAC); and d is a binary variable taking the value one if analysts deviate from the preannounced earnings and zero otherwise. Abnormal accruals are defined as before.
The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at firm level. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels in a two-tail test, respectively.
Column (1) d = 0
Column (2) d = 1 F-value for the difference between (1) and (2) Adjusted R 2 0.345 Table 10 : The effect of the analysts" deviations from preannounced earnings on the association between abnormal accruals and future returns (N = 3,464)
AR it = 0 +  1 ABACQ it +  2 DEV it +  3 LOGMV it +  4 BM it +  5 ABACQ*DEV it +  6 ABACQ*LOGMV it +  7 ABACQ*BM it +  it AR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return over the year starting the month after the earnings announcement, using Fama-French size, book-to-market, and momentum value-weighted benchmark portfolios; ABACQ is abnormal accruals quintiles scaled to range from −0.5 (for the bottom quintile) and 0.5 (for the top quintile); DEV1 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if ABAC is in the top quintile and DEVAF (analyst forecast minus preannounced earnings) is negative or ABAC is in the bottom quintile and DEVAF is positive, and 0 otherwise; DEV2 is an indicator variable taking the value 0.5 if ABAC is in the bottom (top) quintile and DEVAF is positive (negative), −0.5 if ABAC is in the bottom (top) quintile and DEVAF is negative (positive), and 0 otherwise; LOGMV is the logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of quarter 0; and BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the beginning of quarter 0. AR, LOGMV, and BM are winsorized at the top and bottom one-percentiles. To facilitate the interpretation of  1 , we demean the control variables (BM and LOGMV) (i.e. we subtract their means so that they have mean zero). The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at firm level.
Column (1) DEV = DEV1
Column (2) DEV = DEV2
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
